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Prior OT Security
Assessments
Sophisticated nation-state actors: including groups attributed to Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea: actively target energy infrastructure for espionage, pre-positioning for potential disruption, and intelligence collection. VOLT TYPHOON, SANDWORM, and ELECTRUM are documented threat actors with specific energy sector focus.
Ransomware groups target energy companies because operational disruption: even without reaching OT systems: creates immediate pressure. The Colonial Pipeline attack demonstrated that IT ransomware can force OT shutdowns through operational interdependence even when OT systems themselves are not compromised.
Attackers who establish initial access in IT environments use it as a staging point for pivoting toward OT systems. Engineering workstations, data historians, and remote access infrastructure are common pivot points. Once OT access is achieved, attackers can conduct reconnaissance of industrial processes without triggering IT-focused monitoring.
Industrial control system vendors, engineering contractors, and remote maintenance providers represent trusted third parties with access to OT environments. Supply chain attacks targeting ICS vendors: as demonstrated by the SolarWinds and TRITON/TRISIS attacks: can compromise multiple energy operators simultaneously through a single vendor compromise.
AI tools conduct automated reconnaissance of industrial control system environments: scanning for exposed HMIs, identifying OT protocols on the network, and enumerating equipment types from passive traffic analysis. This intelligence enables targeted attacks against specific ICS vulnerabilities.
AI-generated spear-phishing targeting OT engineers and grid operators is personalized with equipment-specific terminology, contractor names, and operational context assembled from public sources. These attacks specifically target credentials for engineering workstations and remote access systems.
AI tools optimize lateral movement through complex energy infrastructure, identifying the fastest path from IT to OT while adapting to detection patterns. This compresses the time from initial access to OT system access from days or weeks to hours.
AI tools are used to fuzz industrial protocols: Modbus, DNP3, IEC 61850: identifying implementation vulnerabilities in specific equipment versions. This automated protocol testing enables targeted attacks against known-vulnerable equipment without requiring manual protocol expertise.
We assess energy OT environments against NERC CIP standards and IEC 62443: identifying remote access exposures, unencrypted protocols, default credentials, and network segmentation gaps between IT and OT.
Learn MoreWe guide electric utilities through NERC CIP gap assessments, evidence management, and audit preparation for applicable CIP reliability standards: CIP-002 through CIP-014.
Learn MoreWe review IT/OT DMZ architecture, historian connectivity, engineering workstation access, and remote vendor access against energy sector security best practices and NERC CIP requirements.
Learn MoreWe build energy-specific IR playbooks that define which systems can be isolated for investigation and which must remain operational, regulatory notification requirements for grid security events, and safe OT containment procedures.
Learn MoreWe deploy and configure OT-native monitoring: Claroty, Dragos, Nozomi Networks: that understands industrial protocols and detects anomalous behavior in SCADA and DCS environments without disrupting operations.
Learn MoreWe provide threat intelligence specific to energy sector adversaries: current TTPs targeting energy OT, monitoring for energy-sector credentials on criminal forums, and sector-specific IoC feeds.
Learn MoreWe deploy AI models trained on energy sector OT traffic: understanding normal Modbus, DNP3, and SCADA communication patterns so genuine anomalies are detected without generating false positives from industrial protocol activity.
AI-assisted investigation tools help operators understand the scope and progression of potential grid security events quickly: essential when regulatory notification timelines are measured in hours.
AI-driven threat intelligence specific to energy sector nation-state actors: tracking active campaigns, new TTPs, and indicators of pre-positioning activity targeting energy infrastructure.
AI-assisted compliance tools automate NERC CIP evidence collection: reducing the manual effort of compliance documentation while ensuring evidence completeness for audits.
Mandatory cybersecurity requirements for entities owning or operating bulk electric system assets in North America. Covers electronic security perimeters, physical security, systems security management, incident response, and supply chain risk management. Non-compliance carries significant financial penalties.
View ServicesCIRCIA requires critical infrastructure owners: including energy: to report covered cyber incidents to CISA within 72 hours of discovery and ransomware payments within 24 hours. Implementing rules will specify covered entities and incident types.
View ServicesThe IEC 62443 series provides comprehensive cybersecurity requirements for industrial automation and control systems. Increasingly referenced in energy sector contracts and regulatory guidance as the technical standard for OT security.
View ServicesPipeline operators are subject to TSA cybersecurity directives requiring incident reporting, vulnerability assessment, network segmentation, and operational technology cybersecurity architecture review. Requirements have been strengthened following the Colonial Pipeline attack.
View ServicesgarrisonOne completed a full security assessment identifying critical gaps, built a prioritized remediation roadmap, and provided implementation support. All critical findings were closed within 60 days with compliance documentation delivered.
Read the Full Case StudyOur OT environment had never been formally assessed. garrisonOne understood our industrial systems, assessed both IT and OT boundaries, and gave us a roadmap we could actually execute. The NERC CIP audit went smoothly because our documentation was already in order.
Related Services: Penetration Testing | Compliance Services | Identity & Access Management | Managed SOC | Cloud Security | All Industries
Nation-state actors targeting OT for espionage and pre-positioning (VOLT TYPHOON, SANDWORM); ransomware targeting IT with OT spillover; supply chain attacks against ICS vendors; and insider threats with OT access. The 2021 Colonial Pipeline attack demonstrated how IT ransomware can force OT shutdowns.
NERC CIP are mandatory cybersecurity requirements for entities owning or operating bulk electric system assets. Standards cover electronic security perimeters, physical security, systems security management, incident response, recovery plans, and supply chain risk management for BES Cyber Systems.
OT systems prioritize availability and reliability: an ICS taken offline for patching creates operational risk. OT devices often have no patch capability, run legacy operating systems, use proprietary protocols, and cannot tolerate active scanning used in IT security assessments.
An IT/OT DMZ is a network zone between corporate IT and OT networks, providing controlled connectivity without direct IT-to-OT communication. Data historians, engineering workstations, and remote access jump servers are typically placed in the DMZ.
NERC CIP applies to registered entities owning or operating High or Medium impact BES Cyber Systems. If your organization is NERC-registered as an electric utility, transmission operator, or generation operator, NERC CIP compliance is mandatory.
Preparation requires: network segmentation limiting blast radius; offline backups of OT configurations; documented procedures for manual operations if automated systems are unavailable; OT-specific IR playbooks that account for operational continuity; and regular tabletop exercises including OT staff.
CIRCIA requires critical infrastructure entities: including energy: to report covered cyber incidents to CISA within 72 hours and ransomware payments within 24 hours. Final rules will specify covered entities and incident types. Energy sector operators should prepare reporting procedures now.
Yes. OT security assessments use passive and non-intrusive techniques appropriate for live production environments. We do not use active scanning that could disrupt industrial systems. Assessment techniques are coordinated with your OT team to ensure no operational impact.